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Abstract
In “Challenging Freedom: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democratic Education,” the author sug-
gests that the presumed decline of democratic learning in public schooling follows from two primary 
forces: (a) the metaphysical implications of Cartesian psychophysical dualism that support an onto-
logical understanding of the self as distinct from social influence and (b) a corresponding concept of 
freedom emerging from this ontology that exonerates individuals from any meaningful level of social 
moral responsibility. Although we agree in large part with the general argument advanced in the essay, 
there are some theoretical and historical gaps that we attempt to bridge in this response. We initially 
entertain the author’s proposed relationship between Cartesian ontology and the neoliberal concep-
tion of freedom. We then consider whether this understanding of freedom is coherent with a political 
commitment to democracy. Next, we expand on the article’s discussion of the relationship between 
democracy and education by suggesting that public schools since their inception have served primar-
ily as instruments to disseminate capitalist ideology. Finally, we propose several principles of learning 
to advance democratic education in schools.
This article is in response to
Karaba, R. (2016). Challenging Freedom: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democratic Education. 
Democracy & Education, 24(1), Article 1. Available at: http:// democracyeducationjournal.org/home/
vol24/iss1/1
In “Challenging Freedom: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democratic Education,” the author suggested that the presumed decline of democratic learning in public 
schooling follows from two primary forces: (a) the metaphysical 
implications of Cartesian psychophysical dualism that support an 
ontological understanding of the self as distinct from social 
influence and (b) a corresponding concept of freedom emerging 
from this ontology that exonerates individuals from any meaning-
ful level of social moral responsibility.
Although we agree in large part with the general argument 
advanced in the essay, there are some theoretical and historical 
gaps that we attempt to bridge in this response. We initially 
entertain the author’s proposed connection between Cartesian 
ontology and the neoliberal conception of freedom and suggest 
any actual causal relationship is probably overstated. We then 
consider whether the neoliberal understanding of freedom 
identified by the author is consistent with a political commitment 
to democracy. The major discussion mostly missing in “Challeng-
ing Freedom” requires an exploration of the relationship among 
prevailing economic interests, conceptions of freedom, and U.S. 
public education. We address that deficit by expanding on the 
Emery Hyslop- Margison is a professor and chair in the 
Department of Curriculum, Culture and Educational Inquiry at 
Florida Atlantic University.
Andres Ramirez is an assistant professor of TESOL in the 
Department of Curriculum, Culture and Educational Inquiry at 
Florida Atlantic University.
democracy & education, vol 24, no- 1  article response 2
paper’s brief discussion of the relationship between democracy 
and education and suggest that public schools since their 
inception have served primarily as instruments to disseminate 
capitalist ideology. Finally, in our concluding remarks, we 
propose several fundamental principles of learning to advance 
actual democratic education in U.S. schools.
Conceptions of Freedom and  
Democratic Responsibility
There is probably no other philosopher in the history of Western 
thought who has endured more criticism for virtually every 
contemporary political and practical problem than 17th- century 
philosopher Renés Déscartes. It is small surprise, then, that 
Déscartes and his infamous quest for epistemic certainty reflected 
in cogito ergo sum is blamed for the misguided and antidemocratic 
neoliberal conception of freedom identified in “Challenging 
Freedom.” Although the author drew an interesting intellectual 
connection between psychophysical dualism and neoliberalism, 
the actual evidence demonstrating such a relationship is decidedly 
scant. For example, it is at least equally probable— and perhaps 
more so— that the neoliberal conception of freedom described by 
the author follows from the influence of Mill’s (1859) essay On 
Liberty and, in particular, his comments on economic freedom. 
Mill argued that economies function best when left to their own 
devices, and government intervention in the economic affairs of 
society is counterproductive and despotic (p. 131).
Whether Déscartes actually contributed to the idea that 
freedom includes a complete absence of social responsibility is 
mostly postulation and, we contend, perhaps even irrelevant to the 
actual issue under examination. The more salient question raised 
by “Challenging Freedom” is whether the neoliberal conception of 
freedom can be morally or coherently sustained within a demo-
cratic political context. We elaborate on this issue by considering 
Berlin’s (1969) seminal essay on the relationship among freedom, 
ethics, and political structure: “Two Concepts of Liberty.”
From Berlin’s (1969) perspective, there is no sustainable 
distinction between political theory and moral theory since the 
former merely extends individual values into the social realm, and, 
therefore, “political theory is a branch of moral philosophy” (p. 2). 
His analysis supported the relationship between the individual 
freedom cited by Mill (1859) in On Liberty and the wider social 
freedom protected by democracy as a political system. In his essay, 
however, Berlin also grappled with the tension sometimes created 
when the exercise of individual freedoms clashes with the exercise 
of freedoms and rights of other citizens.
The issue of coercion rests at the center of Berlin’s (1969) 
analysis of freedom since an individual cannot be free to act and 
forced into acting at the same time. Berlin described the problem 
this way:
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply 
the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to 
that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond 
a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be 
enslaved. (p. 4)
Suffice to say, the almost blanket rejection of social interference is 
the foundational tenet in the conception of freedom adopted by 
neoliberal advocates and largely represented in “Challenging 
Freedom” through the ideas of Hayek. His general position was 
that government interference in the economy leads to a form of 
totalitarianism by constraining free market exchange. 
Alternatively, Berlin drew our attention to the considerable moral 
problems provoked by such an absolute understanding of freedom 
within a democracy. As he put it:
What troubles the conscience of Western liberals is not that the 
freedom that men seek differs according to their social or economic 
conditions, but that the minority who possess it have gained it by 
exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from, the vast majority who 
do not. (p. 4)
Philosophically speaking, freedom, although widely consid-
ered a moral good, has seldom been praised in an absolute sense 
devoid of any social responsibility. One of the more radical 
conceptions of freedom is found within Rousseau’s (1984) political 
philosophy, one that arguably influenced both the French and the 
American Revolutions, where his aim was designing social and 
political institutions to ensure “each [citizen], uniting with all, 
nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as free as before”  
(p. 24). An agent’s freedom to act in both Kantian deontology and 
Mill’s (1859) utilitarianism is ethically mitigated by more signifi-
cant consideration of its potential impact on others. The categori-
cal imperative demands that moral agents universalize their 
individual choices or actions to consider their ethical impact on 
society (Kant, 2012). Mill’s utilitarianism, consistent with conse-
quentialist ethics, similarly demands that we consider the broader 
effects of our behavior. Indeed, utilitarianism posits that the 
purpose of morality, and by extension political structure, is to 
increase the amount of pleasure and happiness in the world while 
decreasing the amount of pain and unhappiness (Mill, 2007).
In Existentialism and Human Emotion, Sartre (1987), the same 
philosopher who proclaimed that humans are absolutely free, 
advocated for an existentialist ethic that entails a profound social 
responsibility to pursue freedom in a manner where the freedom of 
other persons is unimpeded by individual actions: “And when we 
say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that 
he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is respon-
sible for all men” (p. 15). Sartre contended that valuing other 
people’s freedom in addition to appreciating our own is necessary 
to maintain logical consistency. We cannot avoid recognizing that 
we are inherently free, and, therefore, we choose freedom, and any 
decision to devalue the freedom of others undermines the choice 
of freedom as a universal ethical good.
Since the value of freedom according to existentialism is 
self- evident to anyone who carefully considers the nature of ethical 
action, it would be incoherent for individuals to act in a way that 
undermines freedom’s universal moral value. In other words, the 
democracy & education, vol 24, no- 1  article response 3
attempt to deny freedom to others is unsustainable because it 
undermines the universal moral value of individual freedom. In a 
fashion that reflects this same ethical responsibility to others, 
Berlin (1969) argued that “if the liberty of myself or my class or 
nation depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, 
the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral” (Sartre, 
1987, p. 5). As a mode of production that thrives on the exploitative 
appropriation and distribution of significant surplus labor to secure 
its conditions of existence (Resnick & Wolff, 1987), neoliberal 
capitalism is arguably such an unjust and immoral system.
A nonegalitarian economic system such as neoliberalism 
more probably reflects a misguided form of neo- Hobbesian 
absolutism that protects sovereign, or in this case hegemonic 
aristocratic, power while demonstrating callous disregard for 
human dignity by elevating the concept of freedom without regard 
for equity. Contemporary supporters of this “social contract” 
philosophy include Canadian American philosopher Gauthier 
(1986):
The rich man may feast on caviar and champagne, while the poor 
woman starves at his gate. And she may not even take the crumbs 
from his table, if that would deprive him of his pleasure in feeding 
them to his birds. (p. 218)
In the words of welfare economics expert and Nobel Prize recipient 
Sen (1992), the neoliberal strategy is about “justifying inequality 
through equality” (p. 21). Although neoliberals demand individual 
freedom for all citizens, the actual freedom to act rests predomi-
nantly in the hands of the economic elite.
The author of “Challenging Freedom” convincingly demon-
strated that the success of the neoliberal conception of freedom 
owes much to its consistency with core assumptions about the 
modern liberal identity— namely, the chasm between nature and 
self and the supposedly subjective source of knowledge and moral 
judgments. However, failing to locate this discussion within the 
ideological limits of capitalist rationality undercuts the author’s 
critique of the neoliberal understanding of freedom and the moral 
relationship between individuals and a democratic society.
The author of “Challenging Freedom” was correct in so far as 
neoliberals such as Friedman (1962) exploit a crude understanding 
of freedom— Friedman defined freedom as the “absence of coercion 
of a man by his fellow man” (p. 14)— that enables those with power 
and position to act in an unfettered individual fashion to the 
detriment of society. This definition of freedom creates a situation 
where the dominant understanding of and commitment to 
“freedom” eliminates any hint of democratic education that focuses 
on community welfare or progressive social reform. Indeed, the 
self- interested— if not entirely selfish— political ethics following 
from this perspective threatens not only democratic learning in 
public education but also democratic commitment to equal 
opportunity. We must confront the important moral problem, 
then, of striking a balance between the democratic freedom to act 
without coercion and the democratic moral responsibility to 
respect the rights, freedoms, and opportunities of others. As Berlin 
(1969) correctly observed about any democratic context respecting 
the fundamental principles of social justice, “We cannot remain 
absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the 
rest” (p. 5).
As a discursive ploy, the concept of freedom is frequently 
used as an ideological device by neoliberals to provoke public 
opinion against government intervention in economic and social 
matters, but its actual relationship to democracy is largely 
assumed rather than demonstrated. In fact, the understanding of 
freedom reflected in neoliberal discourse is not connected to 
democratic societies in any other than rhetorical fashion. There is 
nothing in the concept of political democracy that supports a 
concept of freedom entirely removed from social responsibility. 
Indeed, it is perfectly conceivable that other forms of govern-
ment, such as a dictatorship or anarchy, might permit individuals 
to act in such an unrestrained or unregulated manner. Berlin 
(1969) suggested that “freedom on this sense is not, at any rate 
logically, connected with democracy or self- government” (p. 6). 
In “The Ethics of Democracy,” Dewey argued that the relationship 
between the individual and society is highly interdependent. 
Individual citizens have an interest in society, just as society has  
an interest in them. The condition and circumstances of one citizen 
inevitably affect the conditions and circumstances of others.  
The individual cannot act democratically without significant 
consideration of how such action impacts on society as a whole 
(Micheletti, 2011).
Public Schools and Democratic Education
When referring to how the history of public schooling in the 
United States has been rife historically with contestation and 
conflict over schooling goals, values, and beliefs, the author of 
“Challenging Freedom” rightly, albeit briefly, contended that “it is 
debatable whether United States public education ever held a 
central role for its civic purposes” (p. 3). In our view, the lack of 
attention afforded to meaningful democratic learning in U.S. 
schools is a demonstrable reality of domestic public education. 
Neo- Marxist Althusser (1971) offered a poignant analysis of public 
school development in which he suggested the expanding suffrage 
of Western democracies after the 19th century prompted the 
aristocratic hegemony to pursue greater mechanisms of ideological 
control over public consciousness through education.
Until the 19th century, when its political power began to wane 
in the face of a rising bourgeoisie class, the Church had largely 
dominated control over public consciousness. Within England’s 
fledgling 19th- century democracy, formal electoral political 
participation was restricted to “gentlemen” who possessed suffi-
cient economic standing measured by sufficient property owner-
ship. With the rise of the bourgeoisie class, and the class disruption 
previously provoked by the French and American Revolutions, 
other groups began demanding increased political participation in 
the formal electoral process. As Althusser (1971) correctly posited, 
it was during this push toward universal suffrage that the develop-
ment of public schooling gained considerable momentum. Public 
schooling, with its broad social influence, afforded the aristocracy a 
more modern vehicle to “wrap students in ruling ideology” (p. 134), 
thereby shielding the prevailing economic order from fundamental 
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structural change. Following from Althusser’s analysis, then, the 
examination of contemporary democratic education pursued in 
“Challenging Freedom” should have included some consideration 
of historically constituted social and power relations and their 
relationship to U.S. public education. The analysis of neoliberal-
ism’s impact on democratic education we provide below is framed 
within the ideological parameters of social regulation and the 
normalizing of people through curriculum (Popkewitz, 2015).
During the early 20th century, the social purpose of schools 
was a hotly contested topic in the United States. Dewey, a cham-
pion of democratic progress, and Snedden, a social efficiency 
proponent, debated the role of public education. Similar to current 
neoliberal ideologues, Snedden viewed social stratification as an 
inevitable outcome of individual capacity and, correspondingly, 
condemned any attempt to overcome the assumed natural order. 
Snedden held as an axiom that most students, a group he postu-
lated at 80%, would only benefit from a schooling experience that 
prepared them directly for work (Drost, 1967). He argued that the 
only acceptable education was one that prepared most students for 
immediate occupational placement within the existing industrial 
structure.
Reflecting his Hegelian- based confidence in individual and 
social progress, Dewey (1916) was a trenchant critic of Snedden’s 
social- efficiency framework, the latter having interestingly gained 
widespread popularity among both industry leaders and labor 
associations. Dewey warned that such an education— and this 
warning is perhaps even more salient within neoliberal culture— 
merely validated class stratification by perpetuating an educational 
philosophy of social predestination:
Any scheme of vocational education, which takes as its point of 
departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to 
assume and perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses, and thus become 
an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social 
predestination. (p. 318)
Dewey rejected the idea of students as passive objects subject to the 
whims of market economy forces. In his view, students as future 
democratic citizens were constructors of knowledge, living and 
working in a world of dynamic social beings with the existential 
capacity to shape and transform their social, political, and eco-
nomic experiences (Hyslop- Margison, 2000).
The current ideological onslaught confronting U.S. public 
schools has increasingly permeated the secondary education 
sector. The massive return of soldiers after World War II, followed 
by the force and scope of the U.S. civil rights movement, gave rise 
to an unprecedented demand for access to higher education. The 
same ideological approach to education described by Althusser 
(1971) that targeted the manipulation of student consciousness was 
accordingly applied to higher education. The community college 
rapidly gained prominence as the educational alternative to 
universities for millions of American students. In fact, and despite 
the hyperinflated discursive rhetoric of accessibility and democ-
racy, the community college effectively functioned as “midwife for 
humbler expectations” (Brint, 2003, p. 32), and a relentless class 
struggle to “vocationalize” junior colleges was instigated (Ramírez, 
2006). The tiered vocational education envisioned and defended 
by Snedden began to effectively track mass numbers of those who 
are in the cultural and linguistic minority into two- year colleges, 
effectively shielding elite institutions and their privileged students 
from the education- for- work approach. In their 1976 groundbreak-
ing book, Schooling in Capitalist America, Bowles and Gintis 
quoted sociologist Etzioni of Columbia University: “If we can no 
longer keep the floodgates closed at the admissions office, it at least 
seems wise to channel the general flow away from four- year 
colleges and toward two- year extensions of high school in the 
junior and community colleges” (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p. 203).
The current overrepresentation of those who are in the 
minority in community colleges and their underrepresentation in 
four- year universities (akin to overrepresentation in remedial 
education and underrepresentation in gifted programs within 
public schools) indicates the success of this strategy. Equally 
indicative is the low rate of students who currently transfer from 
community college and earn a degree in a four- year institution 
(16.2%) but do so in a period of six years (Shapiro, Dundar, Yuan, 
Harrell, & Wakhungu, 2014). Every year, the overwhelming 
enrollment of Hispanics in two- year colleges and their low transfer 
rate prompts numerous applications to federal grants by institu-
tions serving large numbers of Hispanic students, including entire 
representative systems such as California State University (Depart-
ment of Education, 2015). Despite the blatant demographic 
disparities evident after analyses of this kind, educational initia-
tives that pursue massification serve to placate the masses since 
they ostensibly receive an education consistent with democratic 
principles.
The debate over the best way to educate once again became 
prominent in the 1970s, when a cyclical overaccumulation crisis in 
capitalism was conveniently reconstructed and recontextualized as 
a crisis in education (Ramírez, 2008). The publication and dissemi-
nation of the report “A Nation at Risk” epitomizes the convenient 
positioning of public education as simultaneously scapegoat 
(taking the blame for economic ills) and panacea (as the only route 
to lead to economic success). More pointedly, the deflecting of 
economic responsibility onto public education serves the ideologi-
cal objective of insulating the prevailing structural system from 
criticism or reform.
Other notable scholars also highlight the ways economic 
crises have been historically redirected to education in the interest 
of capitalism. For example, Pinar (2011) described the neoliberal 
ideological shifting of moral responsibility as follows:
Employing a classic “blame- the- victim” tactic, politicians have insisted 
that educators are to blame, and not just for what they judge to be low 
test scores. In the 1950s and early 1960s teachers were blamed for 
jeopardizing the American military position vis- à- vis the Soviet 
Union and, in the early 1980s, for US currency and devaluation. Now 
teachers are held “accountable” for America’s economic performance 
in the “new millennium,” distracting the public from the unethical and 
unprofitable practices of many American businesses . . . As it turns 
out, “accountability” is nothing more than a “projection” onto 
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educators of that ethical responsibility to the public many businessmen 
and politicians themselves so profoundly lack. (p. 182)
The current blame- the- victim rhetoric supported by neoliberal 
accountability measures such as the increase in standardization, 
quantification, and competition relies on ill- conceived devices of 
transparency, through which various forms of school data are made 
available to the public. Instead of promoting any meaningful form 
of democratic learning or addressing the social structure of 
opportunity, public reporting of schools is employed as political 
spectacle (Koyama & Kania, 2014); the charade of accountability 
reflects the sole intent to legitimize political action to undermine 
what neoliberals and their think tanks openly call “the cult of 
public education” (Carter, 2001, p. 34).
The contemporary milieu of public education initiated by the 
“A Nation at Risk” report gave rise to the standards movement that 
later morphed into the standardized assessment movement. All of 
these movements provide significant evidence to support the claim 
on the escalating ideological role of U.S. schools. In his article “The 
Neoliberal Attack on Education,” Giroux (2012) argued that “public 
education is under assault . . . the most serious attack is being waged 
by advocates of neoliberalism, whose reform efforts focus narrowly 
on high- stakes testing, traditional texts and memorization drill”  
(p. 1). High- stakes testing decontextualizes public education and 
situates responsibility for teaching and learning— read as 
accountability— entirely at the micro level of analysis. Administra-
tors, teachers, and students become neoliberal scapegoats for weak 
academic achievement, while the social structure of opportunity, 
the most important determinant of academic achievement, is 
entirely removed from scrutiny. The emphasis on memorization 
reported by Giroux also situates students— to employ a Freirean 
understanding— as empty vessels into which decontextualized 
information is dumped for future retrieval. When students are 
habituated into this passive epistemological role, they become easy 
future targets for the neoliberal manipulation of their conscious-
ness. They also learn to view themselves as passive objects in society 
rather than as transformative agents of structural change.
In spite of the intensifying impact of neoliberal ideology, 
public education was never developed historically as a vehicle for 
democratic teaching and learning. As mentioned in the reviewed 
article and expanded upon in this section of our response, the 
contestation among opposing political forces over the purpose of 
schools within democratic societies constitutes a long- standing 
debate in curriculum discourse. There is considerable force to the 
idea advanced by Althusser (1971) that public schools have always 
provided the economic elite with a vehicle to control the political 
predilections of the masses. The current imposition of neoliberal 
market assumptions into education merely extends and deepens 
that troubling historical trend.
Conclusion
We enthusiastically agree with the author of “Challenging 
Freedom” that contemporary U.S. public schools reflect a worri-
some monolithic perspective on education that considers work 
preparation the only important learning outcome. This narrow 
preoccupation includes a profound ideological commitment to 
situate structural problems in students and schools rather than 
within the social structure of opportunity. We also support the idea 
that the neoliberal conception of freedom undercuts the role of 
education as a vehicle to advance social responsibility and concern 
for the welfare of other citizens. However, we are far less convinced 
that this superficial understanding of freedom emerges from 
Cartesian metaphysics as much as it does from ideological manipu-
lation and a convenient denial of the inevitable interaction between 
the individual and an ethical democratic society.
Perhaps the other missing piece within “Challenging 
Freedom” is a discussion of what actual democratic learning 
might include. Although addressing this subject fully involves a 
protracted and comprehensive discussion of pedagogical options, 
we conclude this article by sharing three central principles of 
democratic learning identified in our previous scholarship:  
(a) Democratic teaching respects student rationality by encourag-
ing critique of curriculum content. When students are deprived 
of the opportunities to question what they are learning, they 
become the passive objects of education rather than participatory 
subjects in democratic learning. (b) Democratic teaching 
provides students with alternative viewpoints and perspectives on 
issues relevant to vocational and social experience. If students are 
expected to make informed, critical, democratic choices, they 
require exposure to different perspectives on curriculum matters. 
(c) Democratic teaching does not depict social and economic 
conditions as fixed or predetermined but explicitly recognizes the 
legitimate right of students to transform structural experience 
through informed political participation (Hyslop‐Margison & 
Graham, 2001).
In the final analysis, these pedagogical practices are designed 
to promote student understanding that society is a dynamic and 
transformable construct rather than a static and inexorable one. 
Such an understanding stands not only at the core of democratic 
learning within public schools but of any meaningful conception of 
what constitutes a democratic society. The type of scholarship 
pursued by the author of “Challenging Freedom” contributes 
mightily to a broadened understanding on the integral relationship 
between public education and democratic society. In that sense, the 
article takes an important stride toward fostering wider under-
standing on the agential role of students in creating a democratic 
society where individual action is ethically mitigated by social 
responsibility.
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